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EVIDENCE
RICHARD A. GONZALES*

INTRODUCTION

The New Mexico Supreme Court, by order on April 26, 1973,
adopted the New Mexico Rules of Evidence patterned after the
United States Supreme Court draft of the new Federal Rules of Evidence, which were then bottled up in Congress.' The New Mexico
rules became effective on July 1, 1973. Thereafter, Congress began
the lengthy process of formulating a code of evidence to be used in
the federal courts.2 The ultimate product of that process, the Federal
Rules of Evidence,3 became effective on July 1, 1975, two years after
the New Mexico rules had become operational. Numerous changes
from the Supreme Court draft rendered the new federal rules different in many significant respects from their New Mexico counterparts.
In an effort to resolve some of the differences, in 1976 the New Mexico Supreme Court amended several of the state rules to bring them
into conformity with the federal rules.' Nevertheless, important dif*Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law; B.A., University
of New Mexico; J.D., New York University.
1. On November 20, 1972, the United States Supreme Court approved and submitted to
Congress itsdraft of the new Federal Rules of Evidence to become effective on July 1, 1973.
56 F.R.D. 183 (1972). Almost immediately, however, the Supreme Court version of the
rules encountered stiff congressional opposition. Much of the opposition concerned the propriety of a judicial-as opposed to a legislative- formulation of such rules, but there was also
significant disagreement in Congress about certain substantive provisions of the Supreme
Court draft. For example, the Supreme Court's treatment of privileges, competency of witnesses, and presumptions proved to be especially controversial. Accordingly, Congress acted
to defer the effective date of the rules until that body might expressly approve them. Act of
Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
2. For a brief chronology of the development of the Federal Rules of Evidence from the
initial feasibility studies of the early 1960's through their final promulgation by Congress in
1975 see Moore's Federal Practice, Rules Pamphlet: Federal Rules of Evidence, pt. 2, at 1-20
(1975).
3. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
4. For example, rules relating to comments on the evidence by the judge, presumptions,
privileges, use of prior inconsistent statements, use of dying declarations, and others differed
in federal and New Mexico courts.
5. The following New Mexico Rules of Evidence were amended, effective April 1, 1976,
to conform to their federal counterparts: 201(g) (instructing jury regarding judicial notice);
404(b) (admissibility of other crimes, wrongs, or acts); 408 (compromises and offers to
compromise); 606(b) (inquiry into validity of verdict on indictment); 608 (character and
conduct of a witness); 611 (b) (scope of cross-examination); 61 l(c) (leading questions); 612
(refreshing recollection); 706(b) (compensation of court-appointed experts); 803(5) (re-
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ferences remained. Although an account of the differences between
the Federal and New Mexico Rules of Evidence is beyond the scope
of this survey, some of those differences have been addressed by the
New Mexico Supreme Court in 1980 when the state's evidence rules
were amended once again to eliminate some of the remaining disparities.
The adoption of a comprehensive evidence code necessarily effected numerous and important changes in trial technique and strategy for New Mexico lawyers. Decades of amorphous common law
principles, scattered statutory provisions, local practices, custom, and
courtroom lore were consolidated into a relatively modest number of
rules. Some of those rules give lawyers and judges specific guidance in
handling evidentiary problems;6 most, however, merely sketch in the
broad contours of the methodology of proof at trial, leaving precise
guidelines for judicial interpretation.' This article will survey significant developments in New Mexico evidence law from early 1979
through early 1980, as fashioned by the appellate courts through
their opinions, as well as changes in the rules themselves by the New
Mexico Supreme Court.
I. COMMENTS BY THE JUDGE
The original Supreme Court version of the Rules of Evidence
sought to codify the prevailing practice in federal courts which permitted the trial judge to "fairly and impartially sum up the evidence
and comment to the jury upon the weight of the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses." 8 Although Congress deleted the proposed rule, it left intact the federal judge's authority under common
law to comment on and summarize the evidence. 9
Prior to its adoption of the Rules of Evidence, the practice in New
corded recollection); 803(6) (records of regularly conducted activity); 803(7) (absence of
entry in records); 803(8) (public records and reports); 803(16) (ancient documents); 803(24)
(other hearsay exceptions); 804(b)(1) (former testimony); 804(b)(4) (statements against interest); 804(b)(6) (other hearsay exceptions); 806 (attacking or supporting credibility of
declarant); 902(8) (authentication of acknowledged documents); 1001(2) (definition of
"photographs"); 1008 (functions of judge and jury).
6. Compare, e.g., N.M.R. Evid. 609, which circumscribes in some detail the permissible
techniques for impeaching a witness by adducing evidence of a prior conviction, with Va.
Code § 19.2-269 (RepL 1975), which provides simply that "the fact of conviction may be
shown in evidence to affect his credit."
7. Compare, e.g., N.M.R. Evid. 404(a)(2), which generally permits proof of the character
of a victim of a crime, with Alaska R. Evid. 404(a)(2), which sets out a detailed procedure
to be followed in proving the character of a victim.
8. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 105 (not enacted).
9. H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [19741 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 7075, 7078-79.
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Mexico, unlike that of most states, was generally in accord with the
federal custom.' 0 With the advent of the Rules of Evidence, however,
New Mexico departed from past practice and opted for a flat ban on
judicial commentary. Thus, Rule 107 provides that "[t] he judge shall
not comment to the jury upon the evidence or the credibility of the
witness." Moreover, Rule 614(b), which permits a judge to interrogate
witnesses, admonishes that "the judge's questioning must be cautiously guarded so as not to constitute an implied comment." ' ' 1
Nevertheless, some judges may find it difficult to restrain their curiosity when counsel, for either tactical reasons or through oversight,
fail to delve into certain areas.
One such case is State v. Caputo,' 2 where the trial judge's illadvised questions led to the reversal of the defendant's conviction.
The defendant was charged with issuing worthless checks. He testified
that he had no intention to defraud and that he was unaware that his
checking account contained insufficient funds to cover the checks.
As he was about to leave the witness stand, the judge announced she
had some questions for the defendant, whereupon she proceeded to
inquire, "Mr. Caputo, did you ever consider going bankrupt?" 1 3
When defense counsel objected to this and to a second question to
the same effect, the judge explained that she merely had sought to
inform the jury that the defendant had a civil remedy for his financial woes.
The court of appeals reversed the conviction, observing that the
judge's questions were tantamount to asking, "Why did you not take
bankruptcy instead of issuing worthless checks?"' ' The court said
the jury easily could have concluded that the judge believed the defendant guilty. The court suggested that, notwithstanding the judge's
authority to question a witness, the power to do so should be exercised rarely in the presence of a jury.1 s While Caputo breaks no new
ground, representing instead a rather straightforward application of
Rule 614(b) and, by implication, Rule 107, it nevertheless serves as
an apt illustration of the pitfalls awaiting the judge whose inquisitiveness gets the better of his self-restraint.
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1(51)(1)(h) (Repl. 1970), (Rule 51(1)(h) of the Rules of
Civil Procedure) provided that "[tI he judge, in... instructing the jury, may make such fair
comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any witness as in his opinion
is necessary for the proper determination of the cause." Rule 51(2)(i), relating to criminal
cases, contained similar language. Rule 51(2)(i) has been superseded by N.M.R. Crim. P. 41.
11. Federal Rule 614 does not contain the quoted language.
12. 94 N.M. 190, 608 P.2d 166 (Ct. App. 1980).
13. Id. at - , 608 P.2d at 167.
14. Id.
15. Id. at -_, 608 P.2d at 168.
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II. PRESUMPTIONS IN CIVIL CASES
The major development with respect to presumptions in civil cases
is the 1980 amendment of New Mexico Rule of Evidence 301 to conform to the federal rule. Before the adoption of its evidence rules in
1973, New Mexico had adhered to the "bursting bubble" theory of
presumptions. 1 6 Under that theory a presumption vanishes entirely
from the case once evidence to the contrary is offered.' " When New
Mexico adopted its Rules of Evidence it followed the approach taken
in the United States Supreme Court draft,' which rejected the bursting bubble theory and instead provided that a presumption required
the adverse party to prove "that the nonexistence of the presumed
fact is more probable than its existence."' ' Thus, the presumption
did not vanish in the face of contradictory evidence, and the fact at
issue was determined by the trier of fact according to the most likely
probability. In the meantime, however, Congress rejected the Supreme
Court version and enacted a provision incorporating the bursting
bubble theory for the federal courts.2 0 New Mexico, as of July 1,
1980, has returned to its previous common law approach with the
amendment to Rule 301.
Ironically, the amendment occurred shortly after the two New
Mexico Court of Appeals opinions carefully defined the distinction
between the original New Mexico Rule 301 and its federal counterpart. In both State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Duran"' and
Trujillo v. Chavez,2 2 the court held that, unlike the federal rule, the
16. See, e.g., Morris v. Cartwright, 57 N.M. 328, 258 P.2d 719 (1953); Paynev. Tuozolli,
80 N.M. 214, 453 P.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1969).
17. An application of the "bursting bubble" theory appears in Morris v. Cartwright,
where the court said:
[P] roof or admission of ownership creates a presumption that the driver of
a vehicle causing damages is the servant of the owner and using the vehicle in
the master's business [,J and this presumption is sufficient in the absence of
evidence to the contrary to support a verdict. But it is only a presumption of
law and not evidence. When contradictory evidence is introduced, the presumption disappears as though it had never existed.
57 N.M. at 332-33, 258 P.2d at 722. In other words, the plaintiff may rely on the presumption to survive a motion for a directed verdict unless the defendant introduces evidence to
the contrary. If the defendant does introduce such evidence, then plaintiff must counter
with his own evidence in order to survive a motion for a directed verdict. See C. McCormick,
Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 345, at 821 (2d ed. 1972).
18. Fed. R. Evid. 301 (proposed), 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973).
19. N.M.R. Evid. 301 (1978).
20. Fed. R. Evid. 301.
21. 93 N.M. 489, 601 P.2d 722 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 683, 604 P.2d 821
(1979).
22. 93 N.M. 626, 603 P.2d 736 (Ct. App. 1979).
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New Mexico rule shifted the burden of persuasion to the party against
whom the presumption operated. The presumption was overcome
only by evidence making the contrary inference more probable than
the presumed fact. Now, however, New Mexico courts rejoin those
jurisdictions,2 3 including the federal courts, in which, having served
its function of allocating the burden of going forward with evidence,
the presumption disappears.
The approach now taken by New Mexico has been the subject of
criticism by some commentators, 2 4 who argue that it gives too little
effect to presumptions and the strong policy considerations upon
which they are founded. 25 Accordingly, there is continuing vitality
in the notion that Rule 301 in its present form does not prevent the
judge from instructing the jury about the underlying policies giving
rise to a presumption, notwithstanding the proponent's submission
of evidence to the contrary.2 6

III. RELEVANCY-CHARACTER OF THE DEFENDANT IN A
CRIMINAL CASE
Although it has long been an axiom of American criminal jurisprudence that the character of a criminal defendant is not an issue unless
he makes it one, 2 7 it is reasonable to assume that jurors are curious
about the character of the accused. Although the court's and defense
counsel's obligation to prevent a frontal assault on the defendant's
character is relatively simple, 2 8 some of the more subtle techniques
for informing the jury about the defendant's character are difficult to
anticipate and control. For example, when the defendant takes the
stand, his credibility, like that of any other witness, is vulnerable to
attack, even though he does not put his character in issue. Attacks on
23. See cases collected at Annot, 5 A.L.R.3d 19, § 40 (1966).
24. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 Stan. L. Rev.
5, 18 (1959); Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 324, 342
(1952); Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 Harv. L. Rev.
909, 910-13 (1937).
25. For illustrations of such policy considerations including a representative sampling of
presumptions see C. McCormick, supra note 17, § 343, at 806. See also 1 Weinstein's Evidence
300[021 (1979).
26. See Louisell, Construing Rule 301: Instructing the Jury on Presumptions in Civil Actions and Proceedings, 63 Va. L. Rev. 281 (1977); Mueller, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions in Civil Cases: ComparingFederal Rule 301 with Uniform Rule 301, 12 Land &
Water L. Rev. 219 (1977); see also P. Rothstein, Rules of Evidence 51-56 (1979).
27. 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 57 (3d ed. 1940); State v. Rowell, 77 N.M. 124, 419 P.2d
966 (1966); People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466 (1930).
28. E.g., a witness attesting to the defendant's trait of violence during the prosecution's
case-in-chief would be quickly banished from the witness stand.
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a witness' credibility, however, tend to reveal much about his character. 2 9
The New Mexico Court of Appeals recently decided three cases in
which the jury became aware, during the prosecution's case-in-chief,
30
that the defendant had a prior criminal record. In State v. Gutierrez,
the prosecutor and two police officers made repeated references during the trial to certain "mugshots" and "mugbooks," which were offered in evidence and shown to the jury ostensibly to corroborate the
victim's testimony identifying the defendant as the robber. The mugshots of the defendant had been taken two years earlier and their admission raised the question-of first impression in New Mexicowhether the introduction of mugshots taken in connection with an
unrelated arrest is so prejudicial as to outweigh the probative value of
the evidence. Although the court found the evidence unfairly prejudicial, it affirmed the defendant's conviction under the harmless error
doctrine.
What is remarkable about the opinion, however, is that, despite
affirming the conviction, the court concluded with a scathing condemnation of the prosecutor's tactics in referring to and introducing
the offending photographic evidence. The tactic, said the court, "had
to be a deliberate effort to prejudice the jury against the accused...
[and w] e will no longer tolerate prosecutorial references to 'mugshots' or 'mugbooks,' or the introduction of 'mugshots' in a criminal
case under the circumstances brought to our attention here."'" This
unsettling application of the harmless error doctrine suggests that, although the evidence was inflammatory, it had no effect on the outcome of the case because other evidence was sufficient to support a
guilty verdict. The difficulty with this approach is that it "places the
appellate court in the jury box." 3 2 If the jury in fact improperly decided that the defendant was a person of bad character, who deserved
to be punished accordingly, then the appellate court's affirmance of
the conviction denied the defendant the benefit of the jury's deliberations on properly admitted evidence. 3 3 Moreover, the notion that
the improper receipt of evidence of the defendant's criminal background can be harmless error is at odds with the Tenth Circuit's view.
29. Those cases involving attacks on credibility will be discussed at section VIII infra.
30. 93 N.M. 232, 599 P.2d 385 (Ct. App. 1979).
31. Id. at 236, 599 P.2d at 389.
32. Singer, Forensic Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors-And How It Grew, 20 Ala. L.
Rev. 227, 232 (1968).
33. See Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutorsand Trial Judges, 50 Tex. L.
Rev. 629, 658 (1972); Note, Prosecutor Indiscretion: A Result of PoliticalInfluence, 34
Ind. L J. 477, 486 (1959).
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In United States v. Parker,3 4 the court of appeals reversed the defendant's conviction where the trial court had improperly received evidence of his prior conviction for assault and battery with a deadly
weapon. The court of appeals held that "[i] mproper admission of
evidence of a prior crime or conviction, even in the face of other evidence amply supporting the verdict constitutes plain error impinging
upon the fundamental fairness of the trial itself."'3
A result similar to that in Gutierrez was reached by the New Mexico Court of Appeals in State v. Vialpando,3 6 where the jury became
aware of the defendant's criminal background during the state's casein-chief. At trial the judge interrupted the direct examination of a
prosecution witness, a corrections officer, to ask if the witness had
ever seen the defendant before. The witness replied that he had seen
him in 1975 when the defendant was imprisoned at the state penitentiary. Defense counsel approached the bench and moved for a mistrial
on the ground that the defendant's character had been placed, albeit
inadvertently, before the jury. The judge denied the motion, but
offered to admonish the jury to disregard the witness' answer. 3 7 Defense counsel declined the court's offer, presumably feeling that such
a directive would have compounded the problem by focusing further
attention on his client's criminal background.
The court of appeals upheld the conviction on the ground that the
concededly prejudicial evidence was not elicited by the prosecutor. In
so ruling, the court relied on State v. Baca,3 8 in which the supreme
court drew a distinction between comments elicited by the prosecution and those unexpected comments incorporated into a witness'
answer. The latter, said the court of appeals, may be cured in a
prompt admonition to the jury. 3 9
Although the Gutierrez and Vialpando decisions, taken together,
suggest that the operative distinction between harmless and reversible
error may be the degree of culpability on the part of the prosecutor,
it is not altogether clear why this should be so. The impact upon the
jury is likely to be the same in either case. If the evidence has the
potential for unfairly turning the jury against the defendant, the
34. 604 F.2d 1327 (10th Cir. 1979).
35. Id. at 1329 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Gilliland, 586 F.2d 1384 (10th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Burkhart, 458 F. Supp. F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1972)).
36. 93 N.M. 289, 599 P.2d 1086 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 172, 598 P.2d 215
(1979).
37. In fact, the trial judge offered to go further and tell the jury that the defendant had
not been an inmate at the penitentiary. Id. at 296, 599 P.2d at 1093.
38. 89 N.M. 204, 549 P.2d 282 (1976).
39. 93 N.M. at 296-97, 599 P.2d at 1093-94 (citing State v. Pace, 80 N.M. 364, 456 P.2d
197 (1969); State v. Ferguson, 77 N.M. 441, 423 P.2d 872 (1967)).
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accused can take little solace from the knowledge that the prosecutor's purpose was otherwise. Then too, there is the problem of applying the rules in the heat of trial. It is difficult enough for the judge to
determine whether evidence of the defendant's criminal background
is offered for some relevant purpose, 4 0 without having to determine
whether, if irrelevant, the prosecutor offered the evidence to prejudice
the jury against the defendant. Most often, one would suspect, the
offending testimony is attributable to inadequate witness preparation
by the lawyer prior to trial.
Some of the uncertainty created by Gutierrez and Vialpando may
have been clarified by State v. Martinez,4 1 in which the state sought
to prove that certain signatures were in the defendant's handwriting.
To authenticate those signatures, samples of the defendant's handwriting were compared to the questioned signatures. The samples selected by the state appeared on various parole forms. A prosecution
witness, identifying himself as the defendant's former parole officer,
authenticated the handwriting on the parole forms as that of the defendant. The defendant was convicted on multiple counts of obtaining drugs by misrepresentation. The court of appeals, in reversing the
conviction, noted that the prosecution could have used other exemplars to compare the signatures, but chose to use those which clearly
linked the defendant to prior criminal activity. Although the court
did not accuse the prosecution of willful misconduct, as it had in
Gutierrez, it found that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value. Thus, Martinez makes it clear that the
improperly elicited evidence need not be the product of prosecutorial
zeal or malice to infect the trial with error. Nevertheless, no definitive
test emerges from Gutierrez, Vialpando, and Martinez taken together,
to guide trial judges in the resolution of mistrial motions when such
evidence does appear.
IV. RELEVANCY-EVIDENCE OF INSURANCE

The widely held common law proposition that evidence of the defendant's liability insurance is inadmissible to prove negligence in a
personal injury or death action4 2 has been embodied in Rule 411 of
the New Mexico Rules of Evidence.4" The general rule of exclusion
40. E.g., motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, etc. as provided by Rule of Evidence 404(b).
41. 94 N.M. 50, 607 P.2d 137 (Ct. App. 1980).
42. See discussion and cases collected at Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 765 (1949).
43. Rule 411 provides:
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.
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is based on the assumption that there is no logical nexus between the
existence of liability insurance and negligence. 4 4 Apart from the relevancy consideration, however, there lurks another, perhaps cynical,
notion: that a jury, motivated by sympathy for the injured party,
will consciously or unconsciously award damages regardless of the
evidence on liability, knowing that compensation will be paid by an
insurance company rather than the defendant.
Strict adherence to the rule prohibiting evidence of liability insurance often proves difficult at trial. The evidence may be relevant, and
therefore admissible, to prove "agency, ownership or control" or to
demonstrate the "bias or prejudice of a witness." 4" If offered for
such a purpose, Rule 411 permits it. Notwithstanding the general rule
of evidence, however, the jury may learn of the existence of liability
insurance through a variety of channels. 4 6 Such an issue was presented in Grammer v. Kohlhaas Tank and Equipment Co., 4 7 where
the plaintiff was injured when a compressor tank manufactured by
the defendant exploded. After the accident, the vice-president of the
defendant company and his insurance agent inspected the tank. The
vice-president allegedly told the agent that he thought a defectively
welded seam had ruptured. At trial the plaintiff sought to introduce
this damaging admission through the insurance agent. 4 8 During the
preliminary portion of his testimony, the witness said that at the time
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership or
control, or bias or prejudice of a witness.
44. It might be argued that a person who has insurance is more likely than an uninsured
person to act carelessly, secure in the knowledge that any havoc he wreaks will not be compensable out of his own pocket. On the other hand, it may be earnestly maintained that a
person who purchases insurance is careful and prudent, hence unlikely to act carelessly.
Neither hypothesis seems terribly compelling in support of negligence or non-negligence in a
given case.
45. N.M.R. Evid. 411.
46. For example: a defendant's admission of liability may have incorporated a reference
to his insurance policy (that is, immediately after the accident the defendant says, "Don't
worry about a thing, my insurance company will take care of everything"); or a witness, unaware of the legal proscription against such evidence, may mention it inadvertently; or the
jury during voir dire may be asked whether they have any interest in or are employed by an
insurance company to determine whether they have any knowledge about the case or perhaps an interest in the outcome; or, given the fact that many-perhaps most -businesses,
motorists, and homeowners carry insurance, the jury may simply assume that the defendant
is insured (indeed, the ubiquitous nature of insurance in today's society prompted one judge
to observe that "any juror who doesn't know there is insurance by this time should probably
be excused by virtue of the fact that he or she is an idiot." Young v. Carter, 121 Ga. App.
191, __, 173 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1970) (Hall, P. J., concurring)).
47. 93 N.M. 685, 604 P.2d 823 (Ct. App. 1979).
48. By the time of trial the agent was no longer employed by the insurance company,
having secured other employment with a Denny's Restaurant in Las Cruces, New Mexico.
Id. at 690, 604 P.2d at 828.
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he inspected the tank with defendant's vice-president, he was a senior
claims representative with Hartford Insurance Group, which insured
the defendant company. Defendant's objection to the witness' reference to insurance was overruled.' 9
The court of appeals upheld the ruling as within the discretion of
the trial court. The court focused on the language of Rule 411 which
permits admission of "evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose."" 0 While acknowledging that such evidence may not be offered to prove negligence, the court failed to disclose the specific issue upon which the evidence bore. Instead, the
opinion, citing cases in which evidence of insurance had been improperly excluded," 1 simply ignored the relevancy question and approached the problem from a different tack: "that to suggest that
jurors are without knowledge as to insurance coverage ...

is ficti-

tious."' 2 In effect, the court held that passing references to insurance, even when purposefully elicited by counsel, are not grounds for
reversal because the jury is not made aware of anything it did not
know (or assume) already. The flaw in such an approach is that one
can never discern the extent to which information about insurance
plays a part-even a subliminal part-in the jury's deliberations. It
may be that a juror, if he thought about it, would conclude that a
party was insured and hence able to pay more. On the other hand,
such a consideration may not be a factor, unless the subject is mentioned.5 ' One can never be certain what the effect of such informa49. Although casual or unresponsive references to insurance are generally stricken and
do not constitute grounds for reversal, see cases collected atAnnot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 784-85
(1949), this was not such a case. Prior to trial the defendant, by a motion in imine, had
sought to exclude any reference to the former insurance agent's employment as irrelevant
and unfairly prejudicial Thus, the trial court was forewarned of the problem, but nevertheless declined to exclude the testimony.
50. 93 N.M. at 691,604 P.2dat 829.
51. Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 86 N.M. 633, 526 P.2d 430 (Ct. App. 1974),
involved a claim by the plaintiff who was injured in an automobile accident. She was later
involved in an unrelated accident. Defendants sought to prove that part of her claimed damages were attributable to the later accident by showing that she had filed a claim with her insurance company to that effect. MacTyres, Inc. v. Vigil, 92 N.M. 446, 589 P.2d 1037 (1979),
involved an injured plaintiff who had lied to his employer's worker's compensation carrier
about the cause of the injury. Since impeachment of the plaintiff's testimony was predicated
upon showing the reason for the lie (to get worker's compensation benefits), reference to insurance was unavoidable. In both of these cases, the reference was relevant to an issue in the
case, either damages or credibility of a witness.
52. 93 N.M. at 691, 604 P.2d at 829 (citing Olguin v. Thygess, 47 N.M. 377, 384, 143
P.2d 585, 589 (1943), wherein Justice Carmody noted: "It must now be rather generally
recognized that in suits of this character at least the large employer of labor usually carries
liability insurance.").
53. What little empirical evidence does exist on the subject suggests that juries are indeed influenced by knowledge that the defendant is insured, at least on the issue of damages.
The University of Chicago Jury Project, in the late 1950's, utilized a mock trial of an auto-
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tion will be where it has no bearing on a material issue; hence, Rule
411, with its underlying common-law rationale, seeks to play it safe.
In Kohlhaas the information was not relevant to any material issue;
the former insurance agent could have related his conversation with
the defendant's vice-president without disclosing his employment.
The fact that the plaintiff argued strenuously" 4 for the admission of
testimony regarding the agent's employment suggests his belief that
his cause would be furthered by the revelation. Doubtless, every
plaintiff s lawyer wants the jury to know the defendant is insured,
and every defendant's lawyer would prefer a jury ignorant of this
irrelevant fact. Kohlhaas represents a clear victory for the plaintiffs.
V. RELEVANCY-ADMISSIONS MADE DURING PLEA BARGAINING
In State v. Trujillo,' ' the supreme court had its first opportunity
to define the limitations imposed by Rule 410 on the use of statements made by defendants in the course of plea bargaining discussions with the district attorney. Trujillo had been charged with trafficking in heroin. Before his trial, he, accompanied by his lawyer,
reached an agreement with the prosecutor, whereby he would assist in
the investigation of another suspected drug dealer in exchange for
certain plea considerations. While the agreement was being written,
Trujillo admitted to the assistant district attorney and a police officer
that he had, in fact, sold heroin to an undercover agent. Later, because of Trujillo's apparent failure to carry out his part of the agreement, he was arrested and the original charges against him were reinstated.
Prior to trial the judge ruled that Trujillo's statement regarding the
sale of drugs was not admissible as substantive evidence in the state's
case-in-chief; that is, the state could not offer the defendant's admission in evidence to prove that he had sold drugs to the undercover
agent. The trial court ruled that the use of the statement was precluded by Rule 410, which provides that statements made in connecmobile accident shown to thirty juries. In some trials the jury learned the defendant had no
insurance; in others they learned he was insured. In those cases where the jury learned that
the defendant was not insured, the average award was $33,000. Where the jury learned he
was insured, but no objection was made, the average award rose to $37,000. And where the
jury learned he was insured and there was an objection and an instruction to disregard, the
average award was $46,000. See Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 Neb.
L. Rev. 744, 754 (1959).
54. The opinion observes that "[i] n chambers, before voir dire of the jury, the matter
of plaintiff identifying [the former agent] as an employee of Hartford Insurance Group was
verbal war." 93 N.M. at 690, 604 P.2d at 828.
55. 93 N.M. 724, 605 P.2d 232 (1980).
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tion with guilty or nolo contendere pleas are not admissible in evidence against the defendant.' 6 The state did not contest the propriety
of that ruling which, on its face, seems consistent with Rule 410.1 1
The court reserved ruling, however, on whether the defendant's statement might be used for impeachment purposes. At trial Trujillo,
against his lawyer's advice, took the stand and denied selling heroin
to the undercover agent. On cross-examination the court allowed the
state to impeach him by using his prior inconsistent statement made
in connection with his plea bargain, that he had made the sale. The
court admonished the jury that they were to consider the statement
only for impeachment purposes and not for the truth of the matter

asserted.' 8 The defendant was convicted.
On appeal the supreme court affirmed the court of appeals, which
had reversed the conviction, holding explicitly that statements in
connection with a plea bargain are inadmissible for either substantive
or impeachment purposes. The court traced the legislative history of
the federal version of Rule 410 and found that, although Congress
carefully considered the use of such statements for impeachment
purposes, it ultimately restricted their use to subsequent perjury
prosecutions.5 9 Moreover, the court observed, other New Mexico
Rules of Evidence relating to admissibility such as 407 (subsequent
remedial measures), 408 (compromise and offers to compromise),
409 (payment of medical and similar expenses), and 411 (liability insurance) set forth specific purposes for which such evidence may be
admissible.' 0 Rule 410 is unique, said the court, "because it contains
56. Rule 410 reads, in pertinent part:
Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere...
to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in connection
with any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer.
(Emphasis added).
57. Whether the statements of the defendant were "made in connection with" the plea
bargain was apparently not disputed and the court does not discuss the issue.
58. It is interesting to note that the Federal and New Mexico Rules differ with respect
to the use of prior inconsistent statements. Compare Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) with
N.M.R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). Under the federal rule, the statement may be used only for impeachment and not for the truth of the matter asserted unless it was made under oath. The
New Mexico Rule, on the other hand, permits the substantive use of any prior inconsistent
statement, regardless of whether it was made under oath. Nevertheless, the trial judge in Trujillo
confined the use of the prior inconsistent statement to impeachment in an apparent
attempt to reconcile Rules 801(d)(1)(A) and 410.
59. Federal Rule 410 provides that evidence of a statement made in connection with a
plea bargain "is admissible in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel."
New Mexico Rule 410 does not contain this provision.
60. For example, although Rule 407 would prohibit a plaintiff who was injured while
walking on defendant's broken sidewalk from introducing evidence that defendant had later
repaired the sidewalk in order to support the inference that the sidewalk had been negligently
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no language which limits its exclusionary effect."'6 I In so ruling, the
court recognized an important public interest in encouraging the
negotiation of pleas between the state and criminal defendants. Such
negotiations might be inhibited if statements made in connection
therewith might later be used at trial, even for limited purposes. Although the court acknowledged that its ruling might tempt some defendants to testify inconsistently with statements made during plea
bargaining, and that they might do so with impunity, 6 2 it nevertheless struck the balance in favor of exclusion.
VI. RELEVANCY-CHARACTER EVIDENCE OF VICTIM

A. Generally.
Although New Mexico Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2) permits the
accused to offer evidence of a pertinent character trait of the victim,
the court of appeals, in State v. Montoya,6 3 defined the techniques
which properly may be employed in presenting such proof. The defendant, convicted of voluntary manslaughter, had attempted to
prove that the victim was a violent person by offering the testimony
of four witnesses describing specific instances of his prior violent conduct. The ostensible purpose for eliciting such evidence was to permit
the inference that on the night he was shot the victim had acted
aggressively toward the defendant and his friends. The trial court's
exclusion of the proffered testimony was upheld on appeal on the
ground that under Rule 405(b), such proof may not be made by evibut only by testimony in the
dence of specific instances of conduct,
64
form of an opinion or by reputation.
maintained, such evidence would be admissible to show that defendant had authority to
maintain the sidewalk if that fact were denied by the defendant
61. 95 N.M. at 727, 605 P.2d at 235. N.M.R. Evid. 409 provides simply: "Evidence of
furnishing or offering or promising to pay medical, hospital or similar expenses occasioned
by an injury is not admissible as an admission of liability for the injury." Unlike Rules 407,
408, and 411, which specifically set out the purposes for which the evidence may be used,
Rule 409 does not. The language of Rule 409 specifies the impermissible purpose, thereby
implying that use of the evidence for other purposes is proper. Rule 410, on the other hand,
provides that the evidence is simply inadmissible-presumably for any purpose.
62. Recall that the New Mexico version of Rule 410, unlike its federal counterpart, does
not specifically permit the use of such statements in perjury prosecutions. See note 59 supra.
63. 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 322 (Ct. App. April 10, 1980).
64. Although evidence of specific instances of prior conduct might appear to be more
probative of behavior on a particular occasion than reputation or opinion evidence, it is at
the same time generally regarded as most susceptible to misuse because of its tendency to inflame the jury and arouse undue prejudice against the person whose character is under attack. See C. McCormick, supra note 17, at § 186. Accordingly, Federal Rule of Evidence
405(b) permits proof of character (when such evidence is admissible at all) only by reference to opinion or reputation concerning the pertinent trait. See Advisory Committee's
Note to Fed. R. Evid. 405.
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One of the defendant's character witnesses, however, offered his
opinion that the victim was a violent person. The trial court excluded
this testimony as irrelevant. 6 s The court of appeals upheld the ruling
as a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion on the theory that
character evidence offered to prove conduct "went to a collateral
matter." 6 6 By labeling the proffered evidence collateral, the court
appears to have confused the various purposes for which such evidence might be employed. Normally, the term "collateral" is used to
describe evidence attacking a witness' disposition toward the truth,
that is, his character for truth and veracity. Since extended inquiry
into such character traits tends to deflect attention from the facts of
the case, trial judges traditionally have had authority to curtail the
presentation of such evidence.6 7
Character evidence, however, may also serve as circumstantial evidence of conduct as prescribed by Rule 404. Defense counsel inMontoya sought not to impeach the victim (indeed, the victim in this case
could not have been a witness under any circumstances), but to prove
that the victim had first attacked the defendant. For this purpose the
evidence was directed to one of the substantive issues in the case
(namely who attacked whom), and should not have been characterized as "collateral." '6 Nevertheless, by calling the character evidence
of the victim collateral, the court, in effect, foreclosed proof of selfdefense by circumstantial evidence.
The court pointed out that defendant offered no other evidence
that the victim had threatened him, thereby leaving the impression
that New Mexico courts should look with disfavor upon character
evidence offered to prove conduct when not corroberated by other,
65. Evidence of the victim's penchant for violence might have been probative on either
of two theories: (1) to support defendant's belief that he was about to be attacked, thereby
negating proof of willfulness, deliberation, premeditation, or malice; or (2) as circumstantial
evidence that the victim had been the aggressor, thereby supporting the defendant's claim of
self-defense. The trial court rejected admission of the evidence on the First theory on the
ground that the defendant offered no foundational testimony to show that he was aware of
the victim's violent character. The court's ruling on this ground was apparently unchallenged
on appeal. The defendant, however, also argued that the evidence was admissible to prove
that he had, in fact, been attacked by the victim.
66. 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 324.
67. See 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § § 1003, 1021 (Chadbourn Rev. 1970); C. McCormick,
supra note 17, at § 47; 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 306 (1979).
68. See 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 67, at § § 1020, 1021, in which the author traces the
origin of the doctrine of "collateralness" to Attorney-General v. Hitchcock, 1 Exch. 91, 99
(1847), which sets forth this simple test: Evidence is not collateral if it concerns "a matter
which you would be allowed on your part to prove in evidence" apart from its impeachment
value. Every Anglo-American jurisdiction which has considered the doctrine set forth in
Hitchcock has adopted its holding. New Mexico is not among the 40 states enumerated by
Wigmore as having specifically accepted the Hitchcock test. 3A J. Wigmore, supra, at § 1021
n. 1.
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more reliable evidence. The court specifically declined to hold that
the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value
under Rule 403 and, accordingly, held that the evidence was simply
irrelevant under New Mexico's apparently unique application of the
"collateral" rule.
B. Sex Crimes.
Effective July 1, 1980, the provisions of section 30-9-16 of the
New Mexico statutes were incorporated into the New Mexico Rules
of Evidence as Rule 413. The rule restricts the use of evidence regarding the past sexual behavior of the victim of a sex-related offense.
The rule, roughly analogous to Federal Rule 412, attempts to
reconcile and accommodate a number of important, yet often competing interests: the defendant's right to present a defense; the victim's privacy; and society's interest in encouraging the reporting of
sexual assaults. Evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct must be
screened by the judge to determine the relevancy of the proffered
evidence and, if relevant, whether its probative value outweighs its
prejudicial or inflammatory nature. Thus, the rule operates as an adjunct to Rule 403, under which relevant evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Rule 413
implementing the balancing test in
simply sets forth a procedure 6for
9
offenses.
sexual
trials involving
In State v. Romero,7" the defendant, charged with rape, sought to
prove that the victim had been sleeping with her boyfriend and had
been engaging in prostitution at the time the defendant concededly
had sexual relations with her. This evidence, defendant contended,
was relevant to prove that the complaining witness had consented to
the intercourse. The court of appeals held that the trial court properly excluded evidence of the victim's prior sexual behavior under
section 30-9-16. 7 ' Her prior sexual contact with her boyfriend had
no bearing on the consent question, said the court. Moreover, whether
the victim had been engaging in prostitution would be relevant only
if the defendant contended that the intercourse with the victim was
an act of prostitution; because the defendant made no such claim,
the evidence was irrelevant.
Although the court's ruling that the evidence was irrelevant might
69. The rule requires that the proponent of the evidence file a motion to that effect.
The judge then conducts an in camera hearing to determine whether the evidence is admissible. If it is deemed admissible, the court carefully circumscribes the manner in which such
evidence is presented to the jury. N.M.R. Evid. 413(b).
70. 94 N.M. 22, 606 P.2d 1116 (Ct. App. 1980).
71. N.M.R. Evid. 413.
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have terminated the inquiry,7 2 the opinion, by way of dicta, proceeded to discuss the inherent prejudicial nature of evidence about
the victim's past sexual conduct, and concluded that "[i] t is not the
province of the jury to pass moral judgment on the victim, and the
court should remove the temptation to do so wherever possible."'7 3
Thus, the court reaffirmed the policy considerations underlying section 30-9-16 and Rule 413 and suggested that the defendant's burden
of demonstrating the relevancy of the victim's past sexual conduct is
a heavy one.
VII. HUSBAND-WIFE PRIVILEGE

As originally adopted in New Mexico in 1973 the husband-wife
privilege followed the United States Supreme Court version, which
provided that a defendant in a criminal proceeding could prevent his
or her spouse from testifying for the prosecution. Either spouse could
invoke the privilege. 7 4 When Congress finally promulgated the federal rules in 1975, the provisions respecting privileges had been deleted
in favor of deferring matters of privilege to common law development; 7 5 therefore, the husband-wife privilege in the federal courts is
the product of judicial decision.7 6 In 1976, the New Mexico Supreme
Court amended Rule 505 to create a privilege for confidential com72. Rule 402 provides that "[el vidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
73. 94 N.M. at
, 606 P.2d at 1120.
74. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-505 (Supp. 1975) (current version at N.M.R. Evid. 505).
75. Fed. R. Evid. 501. The federal courts presently adhere to a rule restricting the use of
spousal testimony against the accused in criminal cases. Until 1980, however, the privilege
could be claimed by either spouse. See note 76 infra. In Trammel v. United States, 100 S.Ct.
906 (1980), the United States Supreme Court modified the rule with respect to who may
claim the privilege. Only the witness spouse may refuse to testify; the defendant may not
prevent the testimony. In so ruling, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the notion set
forth in Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958), that either spouse may invoke the
privilege. That rule, the Court said, is the relic of an era when neither parties nor their
spouses were deemed competent to testify in cases in which they were interested, and when
wives were considered to be the property of their husbands. Moreover, to the extent that
the rule allowing either spouse to claim the privilege is designed to discourage marital discord by preventing one spouse from testifying against the other, it is patently ineffectual
since the willingness of one spouse to testify against the other is evidence that "there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve." 100 S. Ct. at 913.
76. Fed. R. Evid. 501. In Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958), the Court
noted that "[o ver the years the rule has evolved from the common-law absolute disqualification [of one spouse from testifying either for or against the other] to a rule which bars
the testimony of one spouse against the other unless both consent." (Citing Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 184 (1839); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933); Benson v.
United States, 146 U.S. 325 (1892); and United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.
1943)).
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munications between husband and wife. 7 7 The 1980 amendment 7 8
to Rule 505 eliminated the privilege to prevent a spouse from testifying against the accused in a criminal case. Thus, the present marital
privilege in New Mexico is limited to confidential communications
between husband and wife, but may be invoked by either spouse.
VIII. IMPEACHMENT OF A DEFENDANT'S CREDIBILITY
IN A CRIMINAL CASE
Although a criminal defendant's character is not in issue unless he
places it in issue, 7 9 once he takes the witness stand his credibility becomes subject to attack as does that of any witness.8 " There is, of
course, a wide variety of approaches to impeachment of a witness.
One category of impeachment techniques involves the relatively
8
straightforward attack on the elements of the witness' competency. '
A second category of impeachment techniques is designed to suggest
to the jury that the witness is biased or has an interest in the outcome
of the case. A third category, the familiar prior inconsistent statement,8 2 is useful to demonstrate that the witness has, on another
occasion, said something to contradict his in-court testimony and that
he is either lying or mistaken in his current version of the event. Finally,8 ' the opponent may attack the character of the witness and
thereby argue to the jury that the witness is not worthy of being believed.
A witness' character may be attacked by a variety of techniques.
The opponent may call another witness to give an opinion that the
77. This latter privilege extended to all cases, civil as well as criminal, and might be
claimed by the spouse who made the communication or on his or her behalf by the spouse
to whom it was made. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-505 (Interim Supp. 1976-1977) (current version at N.M.R. Evid. 505).
78. Effective July 1, 1980.
79. See note 27 supra.
608[05], at 608-23.
80. 3 Weinstein's, supra note 25,
81. The cross-examiner may inquire into the accuracy of the witness' perception of an
event or his ability to recall and describe it with fidelity. Such an approach does not necessarily suggest that the witness is dishonest; rather the cross-examiner may acknowledge that
the witness is attempting to be truthful, but that his vision was obstructed, or that the event
occurred so long ago that his recollection has faded to the point where his testimony should
be discounted.
82. See N.M.R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A).
83. One notable commentator also includes "proof by other witnesses that material facts
are otherwise than as testified to by the witness under attack." C. McCormick, supra note
17, at § 33. Strictly speaking, this is not a discrete technique of impeachment but rather is
an amalgam of some or all of the other techniques described herein.
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primary witness is not a truthful person.8 4 The opponent may call a

witness to testify that the primary witness' reputation for truthfulness
is bad.8 s The opponent may, on cross-examination of the primary
witness, inquire about specific instances of past conduct, which suggest that the witness is an untruthful person.8 6 Finally, the opponent
may show that the witness has been convicted of a felony or other
crime involving false statement or dishonesty.8 7 If any of the foregoing is shown, the jury may then infer that the witness is not credible,
and they may either discount his testimony or disregard it altogether.8 8 When the accused is impeached by the use of the bad character evidence, under either Rule 608 or 609, there is a danger that
the jury will use the evidence for more than impeachment purposes.
Accordingly, the defendant is entitled to an instruction admonishing
the jury that the evidence applies only to the question of his credibility as a witness.8 9 As with all evidence, the trial court must determine
under Rule 403 whether the relevant purpose of the evidence (in this
case, impeachment) is outweighed by its prejudicial effect (the likelihood that the jury may
conclude that the defendant is guilty because
90
of his bad character).
84. N.M.R. Evid. 608(a).
85. Id.
86. Id. 608(b).
87. Id. 609(a).
88. Compare N.M.U.J.I. Crim. 40.20 with N.M.U.J.I. Civ. 15.4 and 17.5.
89. N.M.U.J.I. Crim. 40.22: "Evidence has been admitted that the defendant [was convicted of the crime of... ] [committed the act of... 1. You may consider such evidence
for the purpose of determining whether the defendant told the truth when he testified in
this case and for that purpose only. "(Emphasis added).
90. Historically, a number of American jurisdictions have permitted impeachment by
references to misconduct not resulting in conviction. See C. McCormick, supra note 17, § 42,
at 82-83. In 1950 the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 93
N.E.2d 637 (1950), stated what has probably become the leading common law expression
of the liberal use of this impeachment technique:
There can, of course, be no doubt as to the propriety of cross-examining a defendant concerning the commission of other specific criminal or immoral acts.
A defendant, like any other witness, may be interrogated upon cross-examination in regard to any vicious or criminal act of his life that has a bearing on his
credibility as a witness ....
It does not matter that the offenses or the acts inquired about are similar in nature and character to the crime for which the defendant is standing trial
Id. at -,
93 N.E.2d at 638 (citations omitted). Thus, the New York court placed its imprimatur on references during cross-examination to misconduct other than criminal convictions to impeach a witness. Sorge expresses the view that any act of misconduct has a bearing on credibility, including acts of violence or immorality not ordinarily associated with
dishonesty or mendacity. The only limitation which Sorge places upon the use of this impeachment technique is that the evidence may be elicited only through cross-examination
of the witness himself. If the witness denies the misconduct, the cross-examiner may not call
other witnesses to prove it. Accord, 3A Wigmore, supra note 67, at § 979; C. McCormick,
supra note 17, at § 43; Foster v. United States, 282 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1960); Martinez v.
Avila, 76 N.M. 372, 415 P.2d 59(1966).
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Prior to the adoption of the present Rules of Evidence, New Mexico had long adhered to the rule that a witness might be impeached
on cross-examination by a showing of bad moral character.9 1 Thus, a
witness might be discredited not only by acts such as theft or burglary, which arguably bear a logical relationship to honesty and truthfulness, 9 2 but also by acts of violence9 or general "immorality," 9' 4
where the nexus with credibility is more attenuated.
Rule 608(b), as distinguished from its predecessor, section 20-2-4,"
expressly provides that the misconduct inquired about must concern
the witness' "character for truthfulness or untruthfulness." Thus, references to general moral character do not appear to be within the
contemplation of the present rule. Early New Mexico cases interpreting Rule 608(b) recognized the distinction between misconduct which
involved dishonesty and misconduct which did not. 9 6
In State v. Miller,9 the court of appeals reviewed the propriety of
a wide-ranging cross-examination alluding to prior misconduct 9 8 of
the defendant charged with receiving stolen property. The trial court
permitted the questions over defendant's objections. The defendant
denied all imputations of misconduct.
The court carefully catalogued and analyzed all of the cross-exam91. N.M. Stat Ann. § 20-2-4 (RepL 1970) (repealed 1973) provided, inter alia, that
"[t] he credit of a witness may be impeached by general evidence of bad moral character not
restricted to his reputation for truth and veracity."
92. State v. Moultrie, 58 N.M. 486, 272 P.2d 686 (1954); State v. Madrid, 83 N.M. 603,
495 P.2d 383 (Ct. App. 1972).
93. Borrego v. Territory, 8 N.M. 446, 482, 46 P. 349, 358 (1896) (defendants charged
with murder cross-examined with respect to another, unrelated killing).
94. State v. Martinez, 57 N.M. 158, 159, 255 P.2d 987, 988 (1953) (defense witness
cross-examined about cohabiting with a woman and fathering a child out of wedlock); Territory v. de Gutman, 8 N.M. 92, 98, 42 P. 68, 69 (1895) (defendant charged with larceny
cross-examined about living with a man to whom she was not married).
95. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-4 (RepL 1970) (current version at N.M.R. Evid. 608(b)).
96. In De La 0 v. Bimbo's Restaurant, 89 N.M. 800, 558 P.2d 69 (Ct. App. 1979), for
example, the court of appeals ruled that prior instances of drunkenness, abusive conduct, resisting arrest, battery, and shooting another person were not probative of truthfulness, and
were therefore improper subjects for cross-examination. Similarly, in State v. Marquez, 87
N.M. 57, 529 P.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1974), the court of appeals held that the defendant could
not be cross-examined regarding his firing a pistol into the air two nights before the killing
because that act of misconduct had no bearing upon his character for truthfulness. Although
Marquez held the evidence inadmissible for impeachment purposes, it was held proper for
the substantive purpose of showing the defendant's intent" under Rule 404(b). This ruling is
criticized by Grimm, Evidence: Prior Cimes and Prior Bad Acis Evidence, 6 N.M.L. Rev.
405 (1976).
97. 92 N.M. 520, 590 P.2d 1175 (Ct. App. 1979).
98. At trial, the defendant was asked fourteen questions concerning previous instances
of buying and selling stolen merchandise; he was asked about his involvement in a sale of
drugs; he was asked about his failure to account for the proceeds of'the sale of a diamond
ring which he had received on consignment; finally, he was asked four questions about his
hiring a man to kill or threaten other people.
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ination questions to determine whether they involved the type of
misconduct which generally might be agreed to imply untruthfulness.
Applying this test, the court found that questions about hiring someone to kill or threaten other people had nothing to do with the witness' character for truthfulness and were therefore improper. On the
other hand, questions relating to buying and selling stolen property,
selling drugs, and failing to account for the proceeds of a diamond
ring did involve dishonesty and were proper subjects for impeachment.
Although acknowledging that these latter topics were within the
scope of Rule 608(b), the court went on to determine whether the
circumstances under which the cross-examination was conducted
diminished the probative value of the questions under Rule 403. The
opinion suggests that no hard and fast rule can possibly cover every
situation which may arise at trial, but sets out four guidelines designed
to assist in the determination of whether this impeachment technique
is permissible in a given case. First, who is the witness? If the witness
is the defendant, then the prejudicial effect will probably be much
greater than where the witness is some other person. Second, do the
questions involve convictions? If they do not, then their probative
value is thereby diminished; if they do, then the strict standards for
admissibility set out in Rule 609 should govern. Third, do the questions involve criminal activity? If so, then their tendency toward unfair prejudice is great, whereas misconduct which is not criminal in
nature is likely to be less prejudicial. Fourth, how many questions
were asked? At some point the sheer number of questions asked, regardless of the answers, will tend to persuade the jury that the witness is of bad character. Accordingly, the trial judge should exercise
discretion to insure that the witness is not unfairly badgered about
prior misconduct. 9" Applying all of the foregoing considerations to
Miller, the court found that, on balance, the cross-examination had
more tendency to inflame the jury than to expose the defendant's
untruthful character, notwithstanding the fact that the questions
addressed untruthful behavior.
Miller set out an additional significant consideration, which undoubtedly will prove disturbing to prosecutors planning cross-examinations. Because the witness denied the misconduct, in the court's
view the questions had no probative value at all. Thus, the court
99. Thus, the court rejects the proposition hat the prosecutor may press his cross-examination in the hope that the witness will break down and admit his misdeeds as permitted in
People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d 637 (1950). There, the New York Court held:
"Nor is it improper for a district attorney to continue his cross-examination about a specific
crime after a defendant has denied committing it. As long as he acts in good faith, in the
hope of inducing the witness to abandon his negative answers, the prosecutor may question
further." 301 N.Y. at
, 93 N.E.2d at 639.
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seems to conclude that where the question involves felonious conduct, the witness must acknowledge his involvement. If he refuses to
do so, the prosecutor "hazards a reversal absent a showing of probative value because of the prejudicial nature of the question."' 00 Assuming that the prosecutor has a good faith basis for inquiring into a
dishonest act constituting a felony, he has no way of ensuring an
affirmative answer. Since the act may not later be proved by extrinsic
evidence,' 0 1 the prosecutor must resolve an important tactical question before cross-examining the defendant about prior misconduct: is
the line of impeaching questions sufficiently important to the case to
run the risk of mistrial or later reversal if the defendant answers in
the negative? Miller suggests that unless the prosecutor feels his case
hinges on the defendant's credibility, he would be wise to abandon an
attack under Rule 608(b). Otherwise, the witness' simple "No, that's
not true" deprives the question of any probative value, and the prejudicial effect created by the insinuation constitutes reversible error.
In State v. Cervantes,1 0 2 the court of appeals addressed a similar
impeachment issue. The defendant was charged with the sale of
heroin. A police search of his home resulted in a seizure of a variety
of narcotics paraphernalia. Although the prosecution acknowledged
that these items had not been involved in the drug transactions at
issue in the case, the state attempted to introduce them on the theory
that they were relevant under Rule 404(b) to prove motive, opportunity, and intent to sell drugs. The trial judge excluded the evidence
under Rule 403 on the ground that whatever probative value it had
with respect to motive, opportunity, or intent was outweighed by its
likely prejudicial impact on the jury. The defendant later took the
stand and denied having sold the drugs as charged and denied selling
drugs to undercover agents. On cross-examination he denied ever
having sold drugs. The court then allowed the prosecutor to crossexamine the defendant with regard to the seized paraphernalia "for
the limited purpose of impeachment of his statement that he never
sold heroin." 03 The court of appeals held that the use of the evidence for impeachment purposes was proper under Rule 608(b). In
so ruling, the court seems to say that the act of possessing paraphernalia is itself dishonest conduct.
100. 92 N.M. at 523, 590 P.2d at 1178.
101. N.M.R. Evid. 608(b): "Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility ... may not be proved by extrinsic evidence."
Only where the crime has resulted in a conviction, as provided by Rule 609(a), may extrinsic
evidence (e.g., the public record of his conviction) be received to contradict the witness'
denial See Foster v. United States, 282 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1960); Martinez v. Avila, 76
N.M. 372, 415 P.2d 59 (1966).
102. 92 N.M. 643, 593 P.2d 478 (Ct. App. 1979).
103. Id. at 650, 593 P.2d at 485.
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Although the New Mexico courts have reached a consensus that
violent conduct ordinarily bears little relationship to credibility, while
acts of theft, on the other hand, do bear such a relationship, 04 between these relatively clear extremes there is a large grey area where
disputes will arise.' 0 s Possession of narcotics paraphernalia cannot
be considered an inherently dishonest act, yet the court in Cervantes
implies that the activity to be inferred from the possession of the
items, namely the sale of drugs, is dishonest conduct relevant to credibility. Rule 608(b) ordinarily calls upon the trier of fact to make one
inference: given a specific instance of dishonest conduct it may be inferred that the witness is now lying. Cervantes permits the trier of
fact to make two inferences regarding credibility: given a specific instance of lawful conduct, it may be inferred that the witness formerly
engaged in dishonest conduct, from which it may further be inferred
that the witness is now lying. At what point such a chain of inferences becomes so attenuated that its probative value becomes suspect
is not discussed by the court, but it is apparent that such an approach
does not provide a helpful test, readily applied in the courtroom.
Moreover, the court's reliance on Rule 608(B) suggests an expansion
of the scope of the rule beyond that contemplated by Congress.' 06
IX. OPINION TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
There is considerable conflict among jurisdictions whether an expert may rely upon the statements of others, including other experts,
104. See text accompanying notes 92-97 supra.
105. For examples of conduct thought by some to bear on the issue of credibility, see
C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 42, at 87 (1954): "[F] alse swearing,
fraud and swindling...."; 3A Wigmore, supra note 67, at § 983: the logical approach "admits only such misconduct as indicates a lack of veracity -fraud, forgery, perjury, and the
like." (Emphasis in original); Ladd, Cedibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 166,
180 (1940): "[F] orgery, uttering forged instruments, bribery, suppression of evidence, false
pretenses, cheating, embezzlement, roughly disclose a type of dishonesty and unreliability
characteristic of those lacking veraciy."; 3 Weinstein's, supra note 25, at 608[5]: "[F]orgery, bribery, false pretenses, cheating, embezzlement, swindling, false advertising, frauds on
creditors, issuing bad checks or using another's credit card without authority, criminal impersonation and unlawfully concealing a will" are illustrative of misconduct indicating untruthful character.
106. Weinstein maintains that:
Since rule 608(b) is intended to be restrictive-and was amended to insure
that it would be restrictively interpreted by trial courts-the inquiry on crossexamination should be limited to these specific modes of conduct which are
generally agreed to indicate a lack of truthfulness. The rule should not be
broadened to allow questions about behavior which indicates "a disregard for
the rights of others which might reasonably be expected to express itself in
giving false testimony whenever it would be to the advantage of the witness."
[Footnote deleted]. Such an approach paves the way to an exception which
will swallow the rule. It is but a small step from there to the hypothesis that
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in formulating his opinion. It is a universally accepted principle that
an expert's opinion may be based upon first-hand knowledge' 07 (as
in the case of an examining physician), or upon facts made known to
the expert at or before trial (typically through the device of a hypothetical question). Traditionally, however, an expert was not permitted to state an opinion based upon the statements of other persons, including opinions of other experts. The rationale for the limitation was the hearsay nature of the non-testifying expert's opinion.'0
Within the past twenty years, however, a number of jurisdictions,' 0 9
including New Mexico," 0 have judicially recognized a broader base
for expert opinions, encompassing those opinions which the testifying witness is "accustomed to form and to rely upon in the practice
of his profession."' 1
In 1973 New Mexico adopted the then-proposed Federal Rule
703,' 1 2 the second sentence of which permits the use of information
that may otherwise be inadmissible, if such information is "reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject." ' I 3 The expansion of the principle,
both by the courts and by Congress in adopting Rule 703, simply
recognized that experts themselves frequently rely upon statements,
reports, opinions, and observations of others in making important
decisions.' 1 In short, if the information is good enough for the expert, it should be good enough for the trier of fact.
The rule itself, however, acknowledges that the basis for the testifying witness' opinion may be inadmissible in evidence, ordinarily
all bad people are liars, an unverifiable conclusion which runs counter to the
doctrine that everyone is innocent until proven guilty.
3 Weinstein's, supra note 25, 608151, at 608-28 to -29.
107. Firsthand knowledge is generally considered to be the most desirable of all bases.
See Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 473, 489 (1962).
108. See generally 31 Am. Jur. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § § 42, 43, 86 (1967).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 460 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1972); Jenkins v. United
States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cit. 1962); Smith v. State, 259 Ind. 187, 285 N.E.2d 275 (1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 444 Pa. 436, 282 A.2d 693
(1971); Roberts v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 537, 164 N.W.2d 525 (1969).
110. State v. Chambers, 84 N.M. 309, 502 P.2d 999 (1972).
111. Id. at 311-12, 502 P.2d at 1001-02.
112. Rule 703 of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence which had been proposed by
the United States Supreme Court, and which was adopted verbatim by New Mexico in 1973,
remained unchanged in the final version as enacted by Congress. The Rule provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before
the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need
not be admissible in evidence.
113. N.M.R. Evid. 703.
114. See Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 703.
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because it fails to fall within an exception to the hearsay rule. Thus,
the prosecution in O'Kelly v. State' 1 5 was faced with a dilemma:
how to elicit an expert's opinion when one of the important factors
supporting it was the opinion of a doctor. In that case, the defendant,
charged with shoplifting, had -presented evidence that he was unable
to form an intent to commit the crime because he had been under
the influence of drugs. In rebuttal the state called a psychologist,
who testified that in his opinion the defendant had the capacity to
form an intent. The prosecutor then asked him whether he had conferred with a psychiatrist. He said that he had. The prosecutor asked
whether the psychiatrist's opinion was the same. The psychologist
said it was. That, ruled the supreme court, was reversible error. The
court placed heavy emphasis on several cases from New Mexico and
elsewhere which hold that "an expert cannot base his opinion upon
the oral or written opinion of another expert."' 1 6 Thus, the court
seemed to look with disfavor upon all expert opinions based upon
opinions of other experts, the very doctrine which Rule 703 was designed to liberalize.
The opinion does recognize, however, the continuing vitality of
the rule set forth in 1972 in State v. Chambers, 1' 7 which permitted
a doctor to rely on medical reports that were not in evidence because
those reports were reasonably relied upon by members of the medical
profession. Thus, the operative consideration seems to be whether
the reports relied upon are offered in evidence. In O'Kelly, the witness was asked, in essence, to testify about the psychiatrist's opinion.
The apparent purpose of the evidence was to have the trier of fact
consider it for its substantive value. Clearly, it was inadmissible for
this purpose because it fell within no recognized hearsay exception.
The solution, not pursued by counsel at trial in O'Kelly and, hence,
not revealed by the court in its opinion, would have been to offer the
psychiatrist's opinion, not as substantive evidence, but simply as a
piece of information which formed the basis for the testifying witness' opinion.
To elicit such testimony, however, a proper foundation is required.' 1 8 Once this foundation is established, the witness may state
115. 94 N.M. 74, 607 P.2d 612(1980).
116. 94 N.M. at -, 607 P.2d at 615 (citing Gray v. L. J. Navy Trucking Co., 475
F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1973); 6816.5 Acres of Land v. United States, 411 F.2d 834 (10th Cir.
1969); State v. Chalaire, 251 La. 984, 207 So. 2d 767 (1968); State v. Johnson, 504 S.W.2d
334 (Mo. App. 1973); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971)).
117. See note 110 supra.
118. Thus, the witness might have been asked to recount the factors he considered in
arriving at his opinion, including the opinion of the psychiatrist. The witness then should
have testified that it is customary in his profession to rely upon the medical opinions of ex-
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the opinion relied upon. The opponent, of course, would be entitled
to a limiting instruction that the opinion of the non-testifying expert
may be considered only for the limited purpose of establishing the
basis for the witness' opinion; it may not be considered for the truth
of the matter asserted in the non-testimonial opinion.
A fundamental misapprehension of the use of out-of-court opinions as the basis for expert testimony appears in the case of In re
Dean,' 1 ' decided some six weeks before O'Kelly. That case involved
the involuntary commitment of the defendant under New Mexico's
Mental Health and Development Disabilities Code,' 20 which authorizes a court to order commitment where the defendant, by reason of
a mental disorder, "presents a likelihood of serious harm to himself
or others."' 21 At trial the state presented the testimony of a registered nurse who had examined the defendant. She was shown a letter
of evaluation signed by two psychiatrists and then asked if it contained anything inconsistent with her testimony. The defense objected
on hearsay grounds, and the objection was sustained. At the court's
suggestion, however, the district attorney asked the witness whether
she had taken the letter into account in stating her opinion regarding
the defendant's mental state. The witness acknowledged that she
had. The letter was then admitted into evidence.
The admission of the letter would appear to be proper, but only
for the limited purpose of establishing one of the bases for the expert
witness' opinion, not for the truth of the matters set out in the letter.
The trial judge, however, in announcing his findings and conclusions,
said that he had considered the opinion of the psychiatrists as set out
in their letter.1 22 Thus, the judge used the letter for a substantive
purpose, notwithstanding his earlier ruling that it was hearsay. Although Rule 703 permits an expert, properly qualified, to give an
opinion based upon hearsay or other inadmissible evidence, and Rule
amining psychiatrists in formulating these kinds of opinions. The witness also might have
identified the expert whose opinion he considered and provided some background on that
person's credentials. See E. lmwinkelreid, Evidentiary Foundations 133-43 (1980).
119. 94 N.M. 45, 607 P.2d 132 (Ct. App. 1980).
120. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 43-1-1 to -29 (Repl. 1979).
121. Id. at § 43-1-11(C)(1).
122. The court of appeals, at 94 N.M. at -, 607 P.2d at 134, quotes the trial judge as
follows:
I am going to make the decision not only upon the testimony of [the nurse]
who based her decision in part upon consultation with Dr. Hickey and the
letter from the mental health professionals at the New Mexico State Hospital
[the psychiatrists], but I dm going to consider the letter from [the two psychiatrists]. I am going to find on that basis that there is a likelihood that respondent will cause serious harm to herself and others.
(Emphasis added).
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705 permits the disclosure of the bases for the opinion, neither of
these rules sanctions the admission of such underlying facts as substantive evidence. 123
By permitting the trial court to use the psychiatrist's letter for the
truth of the matters contained therein, the court of appeals unwittingly carved out a new exception to the hearsay rule-one for expert
opinions upon which a testifying expert relies-without any discussion of the inherent reliability of such statements or the need for admitting them.1 24 Although the court seemed to regard the information contained in the psychiatrist's letter as trustworthy because it
was "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field," 1 2 the opinion fails to identify any need for the reports in
lieu of the live testimony of the psychiatrists subject to cross-examination.
X. HEARSAY-PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
One of the most common, and effective, techniques for impeaching a witness is to demonstrate that he has a reason to falsify his testimony.1 26 A simple antidote to such an attack might be to ask the
witness on redirect examination whether, notwithstanding his interest or bias, he is now telling the truth under oath. Ordinarily, the witness will lamely assert that he is telling the truth. A more powerful
medicine is the use of the prior consistent statement allowed under
Rule 801(d)(1)(B). The rule provides that a prior statement by the
witness is not hearsay if he "testifies at the trial.., and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is...
consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or
implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence
or motive. "127 Thus, if the cross-examination is designed to suggest
that the witness is lying or shading the truth, then the proponent of
the testimony may introduce what the witness once said out of court
123. Whether evidence forming the basis for an expert's opinion is admissible as substantive evidence is determined with reference to all other considerations governing admissibility,
including hearsay, relevancy, and competency.
124. The principles upon which exceptions to the hearsay rule have been created by the
courts- necessity and guarantees of trustworthiness-are discussed in 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence
§ § 1420-1423 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
125. N.M.R. Evid. 703.
126. If a witness has an interest in the outcome of a case; or is closely associated by
family, social, or business relationship with the party for whom he testifies; or has been paid
by one of the parties; or is testifying under a grant of immunity (the list goes on), any of
those facts might be brought out on cross-examination to support the jury's inference that
the testimony should not be believed.
127. N.M.R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A)-(B).
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to corroborate what he now says from the witness stand. Confusion
regarding the application of the rule and the use of this important rehabilitation device seems to revolve around two questions: (1) under
what circumstances may the statement be admitted, and (2) once admitted, for what purpose may it be used?
With regard to the first question, the circumstances for admission,
the rule provides that the witness' credibility must first be attacked
by an "express or implied change against him of recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive."' 28 Thus, not any impeachment
attack will warrant the admission of a prior consistent statement. For
example, in State v. Vialpando, '29 involving the rape of a nun, a
prison guard testified for the prosecution that after the assault had
occurred, he saw the defendant wearing a Dominican cross around
his neck. On cross-examination, defense counsel examined the witness concerning his ability to recall specific dates when he had seen
the defendant wearing the cross. 1 30 The witness admitted that his
recollection of exact dates was poor. Defense counsel went on to
establish that the witness had been getting only about four hours
sleep a night during the time he saw the defendant wearing the cross,
3
and was probably tired when he made those observations. '
On redirect examination, the prosecutor was permitted to introduce two prior written statements made by the witness which conformed with his direct testimony. The trial court specifically ruled
that the prior statements were admissible under Rule 801 (d)(1)(B),
and that ruling was upheld on appeal. An analysis of the trial transcript, however, reveals that defense counsel's objective throughout
the extensive cross-examination was to suggest that the witness' recollection of the events was faulty and that his observation of the
events in question was imperfect. There is no hint in the trial record
that the prison guard's testimony was a "recent fabrication" or that
it was the product of "improper influence or motive" as required by
the rule. In fact, defense counsel specifically advised the trial court
that he had never implied that the witness' testimony was a recent
fabrication. 1 32
The court of appeals, without analyzing the nature or objective of
the cross-examination, concluded that any impeachment which "im'
33
pl[ies] that the witness' testimony was not worthy of belief"
128. N.M.R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).
129. 93 N.M. 289, 599 P.2d 1086 (Ct. App. 1979).
130. Transcript of Record, voL 1, at 53-54, State v. Vialpando, 93 N.M. 289, 599 P.2d
1086 (Ct. App. 1979).
131. Id. at 70-71.
132. Id. at 80.
133. 93 N.M. at 298, 599 P.2d at 1095.
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opens the door for the admission of a prior consistent statement. In
this case, the implication was that the guard's testimony was not
worthy of belief, not because he was lying, but because his recollection was poor and he was tired when he witnessed the events at issue.
The court simply failed to recognize that not every witness need be
shown to be a liar to be impeached, that an honest, truthful person
may be mistaken or forgetful, and that evidence of conscious misstatement is but one weapon in the cross-examiner's impeachment
arsenal. If the court's ruling in this case is followed, then any crossexamination, which may lead to the inference that the testimony on
direct examination is not accurate, will open the door to the witness'
own hearsay statement-a result not contemplated by the rule.' 'I
A recent New Mexico Supreme Court case, however, presents a
textbook example of the use of a prior consistent statement. In State
v. Manus,1 3 s two prosecution witnesses, who were eyewitnesses to a
shooting of a police officer, were vigorously cross-examined by the
defense counsel in an attempt to portray them as untruthful.' 36 Fol134. See 4 Weinstein's, supra note 25, 801(d)(1)(B)[011, at 801-119. The practice in
the Tenth Circuit is in accord: United States v. Herring, 582 F.2d 535, 541 (10th Cir. 1978).
In addition to ruling that the guard's written statements were admissible under Rule 801(d)
(1)(B), the court also ruled them admissible under Rule 801(d)(l)(A) as prior inconsistent
statements. Here the court seems to be on firmer footing. During cross-examination the
defense had used portions of the guard's written statements to show discrepancies in the
dates of his observations. In eliciting those portions of his statements which differed from
the in-court testimony, counsel asked the witness to look over the documents in their entirety. On redirect examination by the state, the documents may have been admissible in
toto under the "completeness rule," which allows the adverse party to introduce additional
portions of a writing to explain an inconsistency or to put an apparent inconsistency into
the proper context. See N.M.R. Evid. 106; C. McCormick, supra note 17, at § 56.
135. 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280 (1979).
136. The following brief excerpts from the trial transcript suggest the tenor and thrust
of those examinations:
Q: (by defense counsel) Today you have come in before this jury with this
story about these two people running around the car. In your Grand Jury
testimony you said you looked up and you saw him [the defendant] standing there holding a gun aimed at him [the victim]. You didn't mention
anything about running around the car, did you?
A: (Mrs. Lesher) He wasn't standing still, sir.
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

You didn't mention it, did you?
No sir, obviously I didn't.
It didn't happen, that is why you didn't mention it, isn't that right?
No, sir.
You have talked with the District Attorney many times about your testimony here, haven't you?
A: I have talked with the District Attorney's Office, other than the original
statement that I gave, one time.
Transcript of Record, at 594-95, State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280 (1979). And,
later in the trial:
Q: (by defense counsel) And yet [although you are no longer on patrol duty]
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lowing these examinations the prosecution offered into evidence the
witnesses' prior written statements to corroborate the in-court testimony, and they were admitted.
In upholding the trial court's ruling, the supreme court noted that
the impeachment tactic "called into question [the witnesses'] general
credibility."I 3 7 In other words, the defense attempted to portray the
witnesses as liars induced by the district attorney to give testimony
favorable to the state. Thus, says the court, "[tI here was obviously
an express or implied charge ... of recent fabrication or improper influence,"' 38 thereby rendering the prior consistent statements admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Although the court's holding
appears to be correct in this case, the opinion does not refer to specific portions of the cross-examinations to illustrate the thrust of the
impeachment. Accordingly, one must comb the trial transcript to
find examples of the kind of cross-examination attack which properly
establish the predicate for the admission of a prior consistent statement.
A second source of confusion surrounding the use of prior consistent statements is the purpose for which they may be used. Vialpando
you come into this courtroom in front of this jury wearing the uniform,
right?
A: (Officer Switzer) Yes, sir.
Q: [T] he District Attorney told you to come in wearing that uniform, didn't
he?
A: Yes, sir, and because I wanted to.
Q: Just answer my questions, please. Don't try to tell us anything in self-support in your little discussions here.
Q: I notice you are shuffling your feet there quite a bit, Mr. Switzer. What is
the matter?
A: Well, to tell you the truth, I am nervous.
Q: You are nervous. Is that because you have made up this story that you
have told the jury?
Q: The point is that you were so confused that you had him on both sides of
that car during your statement, did you, sir?
A: Right But I know which side of the car he was on.
Q: You know today?
A: And I knew then.
Q: Because, Mr. Switzer, you have gone over and over your stage performance
that you put on yesterday?
A: No sir.
Q: How many rehearsals did you have?
A: None.
Q: In that little act that you put on, sir?
A: None, sir.
Id. at 632-43.
137. 93 N.M. at 102, 597 P.2d at 287.
138. Id.
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does not indicate whether the statements were admitted for a substantive purpose, that is, for the truth of the matters asserted, or
merely for the purpose of supporting the credibility of the in-court
testimony. Manus, on the other hand, says that the statements are
admissible "to show the high degree of consistency those statements
had with [the] trial testimony." 1 I The language used by the court
might be interpreted to mean that the prior statements were properly
admitted only for the limited purpose of supporting the witness'
credibility. To date there exists no reported case in New Mexico specifically declaring that prior consistent statements, when properly admitted, are substantive evidence." 4' Indeed, the only reported opinion which discusses the issue, State v. Foster,1'4 1 holds that a prior
consistent statement is admissible, not as substantive evidence, but
simply to bolster the credibility of the witness and that a limiting instruction to that effect is proper. This limitation on the use of the
statement is at odds with the intent of the framers of Federal Rule
801 (d)(1)(B). 1 4 2 It appears that the prior consistent statements in
Vialpando and Manus were simply admitted without considering the
effect to be given them by the respective juries. It is difficult to imagine a jury, in the absence of a limiting instruction, confining the evidence to the question of credibility. 1 43 In these cases, therefore, it
may be safe to assume that the juries in fact gave the prior statements
full, substantive effect.
139. Id.
140. In State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 134, 138, 560 P.2d 925, 929 (1977), the supreme court
upheld the admission of a prior consistent statement where the cross-examiner said the witness had been coached. The opinion acknowledged only that the statement was admissible
to rebut the implication of improper influence and did not say that it was admissible for the
truth of the matters asserted.
141. 87 N.M. 155, 159-60, 530 P.2d 949, 953-54 (Ct. App. 1974).
142. The Advisory Committee's note states categorically: "Prior consistent statements
traditionally have been admissible to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive but not as substantive evidence. Under the rule they are substantive evidence." (Emphasis added). Similarly, C. McCormick, supra note 17, § 251, at 604 (citing
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)) says:
While prior consistent statements are hearsay by the traditional view and inadmissible as substantive evidence ... [n] o sound reason is apparent for denying substantive effect when the statement is otherwise admissible. The witness
can be cross-examined fully. No abuse of prepared statements is evident. The
attack upon the witness has opened the door. The giving of a limiting instruction is needless and useless. The trend is in accord with these suggestions.
Accord, 4 Weinstein's, supra note 25, at 801-117.
143. Indeed, it may be difficult for a juror to so confine a piece of evidence when properly instructed to do so. As Mr. Justice Jackson said, concurring in Krulewich v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1948): "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instructions to the jury .. . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." See Note, The Limiting Instruction-ItsEffectiveness and Effect, 51 Minn. L. Rev.
264 (1966).

